

Qiyuan Zheng

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Department of Economics
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Graduate Studies

Princeton University *2021-present*
PhD Candidate in Economics
Expected Completion Date: June 2027

REFERENCES

Professor Pietro Ortoleva
Department of Economics
Princeton University
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Professor Xiaosheng Mu
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Princeton University
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Professor Sylvain Chassang
Department of Economics
Princeton University
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Prior Education

Wesleyan University *2020-2021*
M.A. in Mathematics

Wesleyan University *2016-2020*
B.A. in Economics and Mathematics

Fields

PRIMARY Microeconomic Theory
SECONDARY Behavioral Economics

Job Market Paper

“Regulating Discretion: Information Design with Privately Known Common Interests” 2026.

A principal regulates the information of an agent who privately knows which statistic of the state determines both parties' payoffs from his action. The agent's payoff is this shared component plus a bias, a second statistic of the state. When the statistics are correlated, information that helps the agent learn about the shared statistic may also serve his bias. Our main result characterizes the optimal mechanism, which exhibits two distortions that arise from screening. First, the agent evaluates the state by a virtual statistic rather than his own. Second, the agent conditions on the bias statistic when making his decision. We benchmark the optimal mechanism against simpler alternatives, such as full information and mechanisms that do not condition on the bias statistic. In particular, when the agent can exploit the correlation, forbidding the use of a protected characteristic distorts his evaluation of the state more than the optimal mechanism does.

Working Papers

1. “Strategically Ambiguous Deterrence.” With Yiying Tan. 2026.
2. “Can Fact-Checking Backfire? Mixing Information When the Source Is Hidden” 2026.

Work in Progress

1. “Multi-Stage Application Processes for Distributional Concerns” 2026.

Research Experience

2022 Research Assistant to Prof. Sylvain Chassang

Teaching

Princeton ECO 501: Graduate Microeconomics I (TA, Fall 2023, Fall 2024, Fall 2025)
ECO 300: Undergraduate Microeconomics (TA, Spring 2024)

Professional Activities

Refereeing

American Economic Review

Honors, Scholarships, Fellowships, and Grants

Goldfeld Summer Fellowship, Princeton University	<i>2025</i>
William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Summer Grant, Princeton University	<i>2024</i>
Marimar & Cristina Torres Prize, Princeton University	<i>2023</i>

Languages

Chinese (native), English

Last updated: October 2026